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Abstract
Adversarial training deep neural networks often experience
serious overfitting problem. Recently, it is explained that the
overfitting happens because the sample complexity of train-
ing data is insufficient to generalize robustness. In traditional
machine learning, one way to relieve overfitting from the lack
of data is to use ensemble methods. However, adversarial
training multiple networks is extremely expensive. Moreover,
we found that there is a dilemma on choosing target model
to generate adversarial examples. Optimizing attack to the
members of ensemble will be suboptimal attack to the ensem-
ble and incurs covariate shift, while attack to ensemble will
weaken the members and lose the benefit from ensembling.
In this paper, we propose adversarial training with Stochastic
weight average (SWA); while performing adversarial train-
ing, we aggregate the temporal weight states in the trajectory
of training. By adopting SWA, the benefit of ensemble can
be gained without tremendous computational increment and
without facing the dilemma. Moreover, we further improved
SWA to be adequate to adversarial training. The empirical
results on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and SVHN show that our
method can improve the robustness of models.
1 Introduction
Although DNN shows great performance and generaliza-
tion ability, it has been found that convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) are susceptible to designed adversarial attack,
even if the attack is imperceptibly small. As the modern
computer vision technology heavily relies on CNN, the vul-
nerability becomes a great threat. To mitigate such threat,
many algorithms have been proposed to make network to
be robust to adversarial attack (Xie et al. 2018; Song et al.
2018; Papernot et al. 2016; Madry et al. 2017). However, it
has been found that many of these methods are not robust
indeed; many proposed defense algorithms rely on obfus-
cated gradient which gives robustness against particular at-
tacks only, and can be circumvented by adaptively designed
attack (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018; Trame`r et al.
2017). Among the methods compared in the paper, the only
defense method that is believed to provide true robustness
is training network with strong adversarial examples such
as projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al. 2017).
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Hence, adversarial training is considered as the most reli-
able defense paradigm so far.
However, adversarial training is prone to overfit-
ting (Schmidt et al. 2018). In robust training, adversarial
loss on test set increases substantially after a certain point
while training error decrease continuously. This overfitting
phenomenon brings large generalization gap on adversarial
accuracy and limits robustness. To explain such susceptibil-
ity, Schmidt (Schmidt et al. 2018) provide theoretical analy-
sis that concludes the overfitting is due to the lack of train-
ing data. According to the analysis, the sample complexity
required to generalize robustness is significantly lager than
that for standard generalization.
In traditional machine learning, one way to relieve overfit-
ting is adopting ensemble methods (Dietterich 2000). When
the hypothesis space is too large to explore for limited train-
ing data, there may be several different hypotheses giving
similar accuracy on the training data, and combining the hy-
potheses can reduce the risk to choose wrong hypotheses.
Therefore, to alleviate the overfitting, one can easily con-
sider naive ensemble method which combines the results of
adversarial trained model (Grefenstette et al. 2018).
However, adopting naive ensemble method faces two
problems. First and trivial problem is computation cost in-
crements. Adversarial training is already expensive due to
multiple gradient computation required in generating ad-
versarial examples. Training multiple networks to ensemble
with adversarial examples will multiply the expense accord-
ingly and the overall training becomes overburden.
The other problem not yet discussed much is dilemma
on choosing models to generate adversarial examples with
respect to. The adversarial characteristic of an example is
defined by the corresponding network model. In naive en-
semble method, there can be two options on which model
the adversarial example should be generated with respect to;
individual members or whole ensemble system. If adversar-
ial examples are generated with respect to each member, the
whole system is trained with suboptimal attack. If adversar-
ial examples are generated with respect to the whole ensem-
ble system, the members of ensembles are trained weakly
and are likely to become less diverse. We illustrate the idea
in figure 1 and name it as dilemma of decoupling. Further
elaboration is dealt in proposed method section in detail.
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce the en-
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Figure 1: Dilemma of decoupling. Adversarial training with naive ensemble faces dilemma on choosing target model for
generating adversarial examples. (a) Adversarial examples generated with respect to each member are suboptimal attack to
whole ensemble and less useful to minimize empirical risk. (b) Adversarial examples generated with respect to whole ensemble
are suboptimal to members and make them weak and less diverse, which in consequence loses benefit of ensemble.
semble method which can improve the adversarial training
further. In this paper, we propose stochastic weight averag-
ing method(SWA)(Izmailov et al. 2018) based adversarial
training(SWAAT) that defense white-box attack effectively.
During adversarial training, weight states on training trajec-
tory are aggregated to the average and the aggregated weight
state is updated periodically. This makes it possible to have
an ensemble effect while it does not suffer from the down-
side of ensemble we discussed previously. The adversarial
examples generated during the proposed method is optimal
to the members and nearly optimal to overall ensemble. This
is a special benefit of adopting SWA in adversarial training
which does not belong to SWA in standard training. More-
over, due to the original characteristic of SWA, additional
computation cost can be remained negligible. As a result,
SWA enables one to train models with stronger robustness
efficiently.
The contributions of this paper we claim are as follows:
• We point out a dilemma of decoupling that arises when
using ensemble method in adversarial training. The
dilemma is concerning about which model to choose
when generating adversarial examples to train.
• We propose a SWAAT without the drawbacks of conven-
tional ensembling methods. The proposed method pro-
vides not only effective ensembling strategy, but also
fast batch normalization method in weight averaging pro-
cess of SWA and diversification of member models by
member-specific data selection stage.
• Extensive experiments which are conducted using
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets show that the pro-
posed method significantly improves performance in de-
fending designed adversarial attacks.
2 Related work
2.1 Adversarial training and overfitting
Schmidt (Schmidt et al. 2018) find that the model shows
large performance gap between trained data and test data.
By constructing toy examples, Schmidt provides some the-
oretical insight that adversarial training requires more com-
plex training samples than standard training. Many research
have been performed to utilize additional data (Hendrycks,
Lee, and Mazeika 2019; Carmon et al. 2019; Uesato et al.
2019; Zhai et al. 2019) or external regularizers that can mit-
igate overfitting effects (Zhang et al. 2016, 2018; Yun et al.
2019).
Recently, there have been works that focus more on the
temporal aspect of overfitting in the context of adversarial
training. (Wong, Rice, and Kolter 2019) show that adver-
sarial training with single step attack FGSM (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) can produce robust model if ap-
propriate noise are induced, and early stopping is performed;
this contradict the common belief in adversarial training. It
is analyzed that the adversarial training with FGSM sud-
denly fails at a moment in the training when it experi-
ence catastrophic overfitting phenomena. (Rice, Wong, and
Kolter 2020) also claim that as the robustness of adversarial
trained model degrade as training proceed due to overfitting,
there are huge performance gap between best checkpoint
aquired during training, and the model at the end of the train-
ing. According to Rice, simple early stopping can improve
adversarial training more than most of external regularizers.
These works provide an insight that the overfitting can be
mitigated by focusing more on temporal aspect. Therefore,
we design SWAAT that updates models to ensembled one
frequently during training process.
2.2 Ensemble in Adversarial training
The most impactful research that connects ensemble and ad-
versarial robustness is the research of Tramer (Trame`r et al.
2017). Tramer found that adversarial training with single
step attack make the loss surface around data points hard
to linearize which slow down adversarial training. To solve
the problem, Tramer trained model with transfered attack
from other models which does not have such artifacts. This
attempt turns out to be successful to improve robustness on
black-box condition, but not on white-box one.
Though many researches that connect ensemble and ad-
versarial robustness have proposed, only few surpass adver-
sarial training (Madry et al. 2017) in white-box condition.
Majority of these researches more focus on transferabil-
ity (Kariyappa and Qureshi 2019; Truex et al. 2019; Mah-
fuz, Sahay, and Gamal 2020; Chow et al. 2019), ensuring
theoretic certifications (Lecuyer et al. 2019; Cohen, Rosen-
feld, and Kolter 2019) or finding alternative solution beside
PGD-AT (Pang et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2018; Abbasi et al.
2020; Strauss et al. 2017).
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two meth-
ods related to ensemble that test their model on the strong
attack proposed by (Madry et al. 2017), and show better re-
sults (Grefenstette et al. 2018; Wang, Shi, and Osher 2019).
Although their theoretical motivations are different, These
two methods share one common feature; they train the mem-
bers of ensemble jointly with the adversarial examples gen-
erated with respect to the whole ensemble model. In other
word, they train the ensemble model like single huge net-
work.
2.3 Fast Geometric Ensembling and Stochastic
weight average
Garipov (Garipov et al. 2018) found that there are many
points around the local optima that produce similar accu-
racy but output meaningfully different predictions. This sug-
gests that optimizer can found diverse network realizations
in the training trajectory. Integrating the idea, Garipov sug-
gested fast geometric ensembling (FGE) that saves check-
points from different moments of training and forms the en-
semble using it at the inference stage. In other word, the tem-
poral checkpoints during training becomes the members of
final ensemble. The main advantage of FGE is that almost no
computational burden is required to train multiple member
models to construct the final ensemble model.
Stochastic weight average (SWA) is proposed by Iz-
mailov (Izmailov et al. 2018) in the literature of work to
find better local optima in the loss surface of Deep Neural
Network (DNN) that generalizes better. Although Izmailov
gives three explanations that why SWA can be beneficial,
here we focus on the behavior of SWA in ensemble per-
spective. Similar to FGE, SWA also collect checkpoints dur-
ing training, but instead of forming ensemble with multi-
ple models, it averages the weight states of the checkpoints
and update the single model with the averaged weight at
the end of training. Izmailov shows that a model with av-
eraged weights can approximate averaging multiple models
with the weights; i.e. SWA is approximation of FGE.
The strength of SWA compared to FGE is that ensem-
ble model trained with SWA composed of single networks
in inference stage also, which result in the computational
cost to be remain similar to single model though it has per-
formance of ensemble. Moreover, we find that the trait that
architecture of members and ensembles being same can be
extra useful in adversarial training context as training model
can be easily swapped to ensemble model during training
which enables one to avoid dilemma of decoupling.
3 Propose method
In this section, we depict the problems of naive ensemble
in the context of adversarial training, and propose stochas-
tic weight average based adversarial training (SWAAT) that
does not suffer from the problems. We start our discussion
by representing the adversarial training in general into two
stages : adversarial example generating stage and training
stage. Each stage can be represented as
xadv = argmax
x′∈B(x)
L(mi(θi, x
′), y) (1)
θ = θj − η∇θL(mj(θj , xadv), y), (2)
where L is a loss function, η is learning rate of weight pa-
rameters, {x, y} are training data and label pairs, and B(x) is
the area around the original data that constrain the degree of
perturbation. Commonly, B(x) = { x′ | ‖x− x′‖∞ <  }
or B(x) = { x′ | ‖x− x′‖2 <  } is selected as the attack
constraint. m(θ, ·) is the function of a model with weight
states θ. Ifmi, θi in Equation (1) andmj , θj in Equation (2)
are same, we call the adversarial example are coupled or op-
timized to the objective model mj(θj , ·); otherwise, we call
the attack is decoupled or suboptimal. For abbreviation, we
abuse the notation that the coupled adversarial example xadv
to a model function m(θ, ·) as
xadv(m(θ), x) = argmax
x′∈B(x)
L(m(θ, x′), y). (3)
Also we denote the whole ensemble asE that is composed
of l members mi, i ∈ [0, l) as
E(x) =
l−1⋃
i=0
mi(θi, x), (4)
and alternatively, mi(θi) ⊂ E. The naive ensemble method
we refer is the late ensemble which uses the results of mem-
ber models which can be represented as
E(x) =
1
l
l−1∑
i=0
mi(θi, x), (5)
while the summation can be substituted by majority voting.
In naive ensemble training, the models can be trained with
examples adversarial examples optimized to a member of
ensemble: xadv(mi(θ), x). Otherwise, it can also be opti-
mized to the whole ensemble: xadv(E, x)
Epoch N Epoch N+1 Epoch N+2 Epoch N+3
Batch 1 Batch k… Batch 1 Batch k… Batch 1 Batch k… Batch 1 Batch k…
Resampled Dataset Resampled Dataset Resampled Dataset Resampled Dataset
… … … …
Averaged weight (Ensemble)
Training Progress
Update & 
Recalculate BatchNorm Statistics
adv train adv train adv train adv train
……
… …
……
Figure 2: Stochastic Weight Average based Adversarial Training (SWAAT.) SWAAT aggregates the temporal weight states
during training and replaces the model weight with the aggregated one at the end of each epoch. SWAAT-window is 4 in this
figure.
3.1 Dillema of Decoupling
There is a dilemma on choosing target model in adver-
sarial example generation stage as shown in Figure 1.
Tramer (Trame`r et al. 2017) found that adversarial training
with single-step methods admits a degenerate global min-
imum problem which result in the attack methods do not
provide perturbation that fools the model. In the paper, to
solve the problem, decoupled adversarial examples are used
for adversarial training in addition to coupled examples. Al-
though the method was successful to improve robustness un-
der black-box attack scenario, it showed worst robustness in
white-box scenario compared to the model trained with cou-
pled examples only. According to analysis of Tramer, that
this is because the model is trained with less coupled adver-
sarial examples. Therefore, it can be conjectured that cou-
pling the attack to the objective model is crucial to secure
robustness in white-box attack scenario.
In this perspective, it is significant to train the models
with xadv(E, x) instead of xadv(mi, x). As ensemble E is
the final model that is used in inference, training examples
need to be coupled with E; otherwise, the overall system E
will be vulnerable in white-box scenario. Result of Grefen-
stette et al. (Grefenstette et al. 2018) also support the en-
semble schemes that trains xadv(E, x). In the paper, ensem-
bling the modelsmi(θi, x) ⊂ E separately trained with their
own adversarial xadv(mi(θi), x) showed worse robustness
compared to the ensemble model trained with the attacks
xadv(E, x) that are coupled to the whole ensemble.
However, training models with xadv(E, x) loses the ben-
efit of ensemble. When the number of members is restricted,
the performance of overall ensemble is closely related to
the performance of each member and diversity of mem-
bers. However, xadv(E, x) is decoupled to each member mi
which will consequently make the members to have weak
robustness. Moreover, training the members with same ad-
versarial example xadv(E, x) will degenerates the diversity
of members. In case of training all member models with
same adversarial example, the members come to share the
adversarial subspace, or vulnerability, and chance to repulse
adversarial attempts from disagreement will be reduced.
Therefore, the benefits from ensemble will diminish and en-
semble model will act like single huge model. We call this
dilemma in naive ensemble method as dilemma of decou-
pling.
3.2 SWA based Adversarial Training
Adoption of SWA. In this section, we propose SWA based
adversarial training (SWAAT). The main characterestic of
SWA is that it utilize single network with averaged weight
instead of averaging multiple networks. The weight to be av-
eraged is collected and aggregated during training. In orig-
inal SWA, temporal weight states at the end of each epoch
are aggregated to buffer by cumulative moving average, and
model is updated with the aggregated weight at the end of
the training.
In our SWAAT, on the other hand, the temporal weight
states after every training iteration are aggregated to buffer
by simple moving average, and model is updated with the
aggregated weight at the end of each epoch. For abbrevia-
tion, we denote SWAAT has SWAAT-window with size M
epochs if SWAAT aggregates M · k temporal weight states
where k-iteration completes an epoch of training. More-
over, if n-iteration completes N epochs of training, SWAAT
model with SWAAT-window M at the end of N -th epoch
can be represented
EN (x) = m(θswa, x) = m(
1
Mk
∑
i∈S
θi, x), (6)
while θi is the weight state of a model m after i-th iteration
in training, and S is iteration set in SWAAT-window, i.e.,
S = { i | n−Mk + 1 < i < n }.
Izmailov (Izmailov et al. 2018) claimed that if weight
states are close to each other, a model with averaged weight
approximates averaging model with the weight, i.e,
m(
1
Mk
∑
i∈S
θi, x) ≈ 1
Mk
∑
i∈S
m(θi, x) (7)
and therefore, it can be described that
m(θswa, x) =
⋃
i∈S
m(θi, x) (8)
We note that one important difference in SWAAT from
SWA is that weight of the model is updated to aggregated
weight θswa at the end of every epoch instead of final epoch.
While SWA are effectively similar to ensemble model, the
computational cost of it is comparable to that of the SGD
counterpart. The only additional operation is weight state
aggregation which can be implemented efficiently by using
moving average method and recalculating statistic related
to batch normalization at the end of the training. Basically,
SWAAT follows the mechanism of SWA and therefore it re-
duces generalization gap by taking advantage of ensemble
effect without significant computation cost increase.
Moreover, the dilemma of decoupling is not problem-
atic in SWAAT. As we update the model to ensemble
model at the end of every epoch, the initial point of the
model at epoch N is an ensembled model EN−1. In other
words, training process in N -th epochs can be regarded
as adversarial training the ensemble model EN−1. We
remark that in normal SGD-based adversarial training, the
adversarial minibatch xadv(m(θi), x) that is trained in i-th
iteration is slightly decoupled to the model at different
point in training, m(θj , x)|j 6=i, as weight parameters are
updated. In SWAAT, ensemble model is decoupled only
as much as the model is in normal SGD based adversarial
training. It can be more easily understood when one omits
the aggregation at the end of training. Also, it is obvious
that each minibatch of adversarial examples is coupled to
the corresponding temporal state of the model which is a
member of ensemble. Therefore, the adversarial examples
trained during SWAAT is coupled with the members and
not decoupled severely with the whole ensemble and does
not suffer from decoupling dilemma.
Batch Normalization Statistic. When weight states are av-
eraged in SWA, mean and standard deviation of hidden re-
sponse in network should be recalculated respectively. Ad-
ditional cost for this recalculation in SWA is neglectable
as the model is updated to θswa once. On the other hand,
in the proposed SWAAT, weights of the model are aggre-
gated and updated for every epoch. Also, adversarial exam-
ples are generated in evaluation mode which uses the statis-
tic of the whole data. Therefore, to generate adversarial ex-
ample properly, the batch normalization statistic of adversar-
ial example should be recalculated after every aggregation.
The recalculation incurs overheads as it additionally requires
generating adversarial examples for every epoch.
Algorithm 1: Stochastic Weight Average based
Adversarial Training
Constant : SWAAT-window M ,
total training epoch Ntotal, iterations per epoch k
Input : model m(θ0), training dataset Dwhole
Output: robust model m(θswa)
Initialize D ← Dwhole, θswa ← 0
for iteration i = 0,1, ... Ntotal do
x← Get batch(D)
xadv ← PGD(m(θi), x)
θi+1 ← SGD(m(θi), xadv)
w ← min(i,Mk)
θswa ← (w−1)w θswa + 1wθi+1
if mod(i,k) = 0 then
θi+1 ← θswa
E ← m(θi+1)
E ← Adjust BN(E,Dwhole)
D ← HEM (E,Dwhole)
D ← Sample with replacement (D)
end
end
Fortunately, we empirically found that recalculating the
statistics with natural image gives similar performance at
the end to that with adversarial examples. Therefore, it is
unnecessary to generate adversarial examples additionally.
This is surprising because adversarial examples are expected
to have significantly different statistic on response from
that of normal examples. More studies are required on this
phenomenon.
Diversity via Data Resampling. SWAAT can be improved
by introducing more diversity to the members. In original
SWA, Izmailov used cyclic learning rate which can find
more diverse points. However, the attempt was not success-
ful; it was empirically shown that models trained with such
cyclic learning rate perform worse than constant learning
rate counterpart.
We propose another way that delivers diversity to the
members of SWAAT. Adversarial training can be regarded
as very sensitive to the training data because it overfits eas-
ily. This means that slight change in training dataset can in-
troduce diversity on members. Hence, we resample the data
from the original dataset with replacement while fixing the
size of resampled one to be same with the original dataset.
Three resampling strategies are tested in this paper. The
first one is resampling with bootstrapped (BOOT). Each ex-
ample in the original dataset has same probability to be sam-
pled and the sampling is performed at the beginning of every
epoch. As BOOT is just a random sampling, computational
overhead of negligible.
The second one is resampling with hard example min-
ing (HEM). When the weights are aggregated and Ensemble
EN has been formed, we evaluate the model with the train-
ing set, and mark the examples that are misclassified by E.
At the end of each epoch, training data for the next epoch
is sampled while the misclassified examples have tripled
probability to be sampled compared to the correctly classi-
fied ones. However, hard example mining can be costly as it
requires additional adversarial example generation. To deal
with the problem, we tried HEM version with less frequent
mining also.
The last one is resampling with online-hard example min-
ing (OHEM). During the adversarial training in each epoch,
the misclassified training examples are marked. Although
this method does not select hard examples of E exactly, it
does not require additional adversarial example generations.
Therefore, additional computational cost is negligible in this
scheme.We outline an example of our method with pseudo
code Algorithm 1. In the example, PGD is used for adversar-
ial training and data resampling is done with hard example
mining at the end of every epoch.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Implementation Detail
The proposed idea is implemented by training three popu-
lar benchmark datasets: CIFAR10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN.
We use pre-activation ResNet18 (preact-18) (He et al. 2016)
as our default model to train and trained WideResNet-28-
10 (wrn-28-10) (Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016) addition-
ally for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
To set the baseline, we reimplement projected gradient de-
scent based adversarial training (PGD-AT), following the
original training protocol (Madry et al. 2017) mostly. The
only difference from the original protocol is that we train
models with adversarial examples generated by 10 step iter-
ations instead of 7.
SWAAT uses similar protocols to the baseline model, and
therefore, we only describe the difference. For CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100, checkpoint at 100-th epoch of the baseline
models are used as the initial point of SWAAT. This is sim-
ilar to that original SWA uses model trained with conven-
tional SGD as its initial point. On the other hand, in case
of SVHN, we find that the moment model starts to overfit
is very inconsistent and use SWAAT from scratch. For fair
comparison, we train SWAAT for 100 epochs on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 to fix the total training length to 200 epochs.
Regardless the datasets, SWAAT-window is set to four.
For example, as one epoch of CIFAR-10 is composed of 391
iterations, SWAAT aggregates weight states of 4 × 391 lat-
est iterations. Similar to the original SWA that uses higher
learning rate compared to that of conventional SGD training,
we modify the learning rate of SWAAT to be higher than
that of the baseline. However, different from SWA, we mod-
ify the learning rate adaptively to SWAAT-window when we
try multiple configurations of SWAAT-window. We set the
learning rate of SWAAT to be SWAAT-window times larger
than the learning rate of the baseline at every moment of
training; i.e., as the learning rate in 100-th epoch in CIFAR-
10 training is 0.01, the learning rate of SWAAT starts from
0.04.
The effect of individual implementation elements are de-
scribed in supplementary materials
4.2 Main results
As our proposed method targets the white-box scenario, we
evaluate our model under PGD attack (Madry et al. 2017)
and Carlini-Wanger attack (CW) (Carlini and Wagner 2017).
PGD is considered as a universal first-order adversary, i.e.,
the strongest attack utilizing the local first order information
about the network. Under l∞ constraint, PGD with step-size
α = 2/255 and radius  = 8/255 was used as the attack
following the original paper (Madry et al. 2017). We notate
n-step PGD as PGD-n. PGD-10 and PGD-20 are tested as
the benchmark. Under l2 constraint, we test CW attack with
c = 0.2, κ = 0, and learning rate 0.01. This is to compare
with (Liu et al. 2018) mainly.
The performance that we report is that of the best per-
forming checkpoint we get during training to not get penalty
from the protocol. We remark that Rice claim PGD-AT with
early stopping outperforms TRADES (Zhang et al. 2019)
with early stopping which is considered as state-of-the-arts;
we observe similar results. In short, PGD-AT with early
stopping is a strong baseline. To prevent the unstable train-
ing methods we also report the average of accuracy on fiv
epochs to the best ones.
We show the performance of our models on Table 1. The
result of SWAAT with HEM that mines hard example for ev-
ery epoch is reported only, as it shows the highest accuracy.
Beside of reporting the result of our own experiments, we
represent the results from other recent defense methods in
the table to show how robust the SWAAT model is.
To the best of our knowledge, the only work that takes
benefit of ensemble and surpasses PGD-AT under white-
box PGD attack is the method introduced by (Wang, Shi,
and Osher 2019), and (Grefenstette et al. 2018). Beside two
method, (Liu et al. 2018) also claim that their method is
comparable in optimization based attack CW.
As one can observe, a model trained with SWAAT exceed
other methods in all most all experiments with even if it has
smaller architecture such as preact-18. We also remark that
pretrain method (Hendrycks, Lee, and Mazeika 2019) uti-
lizes downsampled Imagenet data (Chrabaszcz, Loshchilov,
and Hutter 2017) for pretraining. In conclusion, even though
SWAAT is simple modification of PGD-AT, it improve the
robustness of models significantly.
4.3 Comparison of Data Resampling Strategy
In this subsection, we compare the influence of different
data resampling methods discussed previously. For HEM,
we try several versions that mines hard examples with dif-
ferent frequently. HEM-N means that hard examples are
mined for every N epochs while resampling is performed
every epoch. We found that BOOT only makes the robust-
ness of models worse. It can be analyzed that the negative
effect from not seeing whole data is bigger than the posi-
tive effect from bringing diversity to the members. The re-
sults from different versions of HEM give clear message;
performing hard example mining more result in better ro-
bustness. However, hard example mining requires additional
adversarial example generation, and therefore, there is trade-
off between adversarial accuracy and computational cost.
Dataset Method Architecture Natural PGD-10 PGD-20 CW (l2)
CIFAR10
PGD-AT (2017)* preact-18 82.91(82.98) 53.01(52.69) 52.76(52.54) 78.10
PGD-AT (2017)* wrn-28-10 87.01(87.08) 56.44(56.17) 56.23(56.02) 79.24
TRADE (2019)* preact-18 81.94(82.11) 51.35(50.99) 51.01(50.74) 79.18
TRADE (2019) wrn-34-10 84.92 56.6 56.43 -
Pretrain(2019) wrn-34-10 87.1- - 57.4- -
LLR (2019) wrn-28-8 86.83 - 52.99 -
ATES (2020) wrn-34-10 86.84 - 53.18 -
RSE(2018)† VGG-16 - - - 34.75
Naive (2018)† wrn-28-10 ×4 88.- - 52.- -
EnRes(2019)† wrn-34-10 86.19 - 56.60 -
SWAAT(Ours)* preact-18 83.85(83.89) 58.56(58.32) 58.23(58.11) 81.66
SWAAT(Ours)* wrn-28-10 87.98(87.93) 60.94(60.69) 60.57(60.33) 83.04
CIFAR100
PGD-AT (2017)* preact-18 51.17 (51.31) 25.95(25.71) 25.64(25.52) 48.97
PGD-AT (2017)* wrn-28-10 57.77(58.19) 28.75(28.53) 28.62(28.34) 49.11
TRADE (2019)* preact-18 53.07(52.90) 25.04(24.78) 24.82(24.66) -
Pretrain(2019) preact18 59.2 - 33.5- -
EnRes (2019)† preact-20 ×5 51.72 - 27.80 -
SWAAT(Ours)*† preact-18 55.08(55.01) 28.61(28.43) 28.27(28.19) 49.20
SWAAT(Ours)*† wrn-28-10 59.84(59.67) 31.84(31.81) 31.07(30.93) 49.83
SVHN PGD-AT (2017)
* preact-18 91.76(90.49) 67.35(57.40) 58.50(55.87) 23.50
SWAAT(Ours)* preact-18 92.61(92.63) 62.98(62.57) 61.48(61.21) 60.37
Table 1: Adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN datasets. ∗ indicates that the result are from our own
implementation; otherwise the result from the official papers are reported. † indicates the method uses ensemble concepts.
Numbers in parentheses indicates the average of 5 adjacent epochs
Data resampling strategy Accuracy
without resampling (baseline) 56.08 (+0.00)
Boot strapping (BOOT) 55.67 (-0.41)
Hard example mining / 1 epoch (HEM-1) 58.56 (+2.48)
Hard example mining / 2 epoch (HEM-2) 58.13 (+2.05)
Hard example mining / 4 epoch (HEM-4) 57.49 (+1.41)
Online hard example mining (OHEM) 57.04 (+0.98)
Table 2: Comparison on data resampling methods. PGD-
10, preact-18, CIFAR-10 is used. Numbers in parentheses
indicates the improvement from the baseline
The model trained with OHEM shows reasonable perfor-
mance considering that OHEM does not cause severe com-
putational cost increase.
4.4 Obfuscated Gradient Test
The validity of defense methods has arisen to a serious issue
in the research field. To reveal whether our defense relies on
obfuscated gradient or not, we conduct two experiments that
are introduced by Athalye (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner
2018). We evaluate our model with 1000-step PGD (PGD-
1k) with l∞ bound  = 8/255 which is expected to show
similar accuracy and PGD-100 with  = ∞ which is ex-
pected to show accuracy. We display the result of experi-
ments on Table 3. The performance of our models merely
degrade on PGD-1k compared to PGD-10, and become zero
on unconstrained attack. This indicate our defense is not re-
Dataset Model PGD-10 PGD-1k  =∞
CIFAR10 preact-18 58.56 58.13 0.00wrn-28-10 60.69 59.72 0.00
CIFAR100 preact-18 28.53 28.21 0.00wrn-28-10 31.84 31.26 0.00
SVHN preact-18 62.98 60.42 0.00
Table 3: Obfuscated gradient Test. 10 steps, 1000 steps
PGD with  = 8/255 and 100 step PGD with  = ∞ has
been tested. The result shows that our method is not a result
of obfuscated gradients
sult from obfuscated gradient.
5 Conclusion
Adversarial attack is a serious issue in modern computer vi-
sion society. The robustness that can be acquired from ad-
versarial training is limited due to its susceptibility to over-
fitting. To break the limitation, we proposed SWAAT that
take benefit from ensemble without severe computation cost
increment. The experiments shows that SWAAT is the most
effective ensemble method in the context of adversarial ro-
bustness. This is because the diversity and robustness of in-
dividual members are considered in training stage. We be-
lieve that our study brings new insight to the field and accel-
erate the the adoption of machine learning technologies to
real world.
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